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**1962/11/05**

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# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

00973

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Nov 5 10 55 PM '62

Origin  
S/S

ACTION: USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1200

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDO/12

EYES ONLY FOR STEVENSON AND MCCLOY

REVIEWED BY MOSKOWITZ DATE 4

Execu-  
tive  
Com-  
mittee  
Distri-  
bution.

As indicated in Deptel 1194, we want to be able to see missiles ourselves departing/number and associated equipment in procedures promise/so procedure suggested by Kuznetsov reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential.

In this connection, following is guidance, as follows: by Kuznetsov, indicating kind of inspection procedure we believe would be necessary to check outgoing cargoes. Procedures worked out by inter-agency panel. We would strongly prefer QTE on board UNQTE procedure but prepared to accept QTE along side UNQTE procedure if necessary provided equipment is on top of deck. In discussing these procedures with Kuznetsov you should make clear our continued insistence on UN ground ON-248 hiding or to guard against re-introduction of offensive weapons.

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## 1. Problem

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Drafted by: 11/5/62  
DEFENSE: Capt Zurnalt+IO:UMP:JJSisco  
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G - Mr. Johnson (draft)  
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1. Problem. Recommend a procedure which will provide adequate verification that the USSR has in fact removed offensive equipment from Cuba.

2. Background. Kuznetsov has communicated to McCloy the willingness of the Soviet Government to work out a verification procedure as follows:

a. If Castro should give his consent to an on-site inspection verification of shipments might be made at the docks in Cuba;

b. In the event that this procedure cannot be worked out, inspection at sea or other eventualities would have to be planned for;

c. The USSR is prepared to give U.S. photographs of the sites dismantled form;

d. USSR is prepared to give the U.S. its schedule of removal of missiles to the ports and its shipping schedules;

e. USSR is prepared to permit U.S. vessels to come along side Soviet ships, the missiles loaded in such a way as to enable the U.S. to see and count the missiles;

f. USSR is further prepared to give the U.S. photographs of 42 missiles on the way out.

3. Frame of Reference

a. The USSR is expected to have complied fully with the commitments undertaken in paragraphs c, d, and f above.

b. In addition, it is expected that the USSR will have complied ~~accepted~~

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complied with the position of the U.S. Government that IL28s are also to be removed from Cuba as offensive equipment.

c. The commitment to remove missiles is considered to include such as appear on the list at the end of this message. the removal of/associated items/~~such as launching pads, loaded rockets, motor launchers, missile transporters, trucks, missile erectors, missile cranes, missile containers, fuel tank trailers, wheeled prime movers, fuel vehicles, oxidizer tank trailers, observation cars, launchers, power generators, rocket launchers, the facilities on pads, etc.~~

d. Photos of weapon crates or empty missile sites can be falsified as to time or location and therefore, although of value, are not foolproof.

e. The U.S. Government ~~need~~ needs to determine how Soviets propose to demonstrate no nuclear warheads or bombs remain in Cuba.

f. The question of fighter-bombers, KOMAR motor torpedo boats and missile fuel has not been answered.

#### 4. Required Verification in Cuban Ports

a. Inspection of equipment prior to loading is much to be preferred over inspection after loading on board ship.

b. Although from the standpoint of verification it is preferable that inspection of all components should take place prior to crating, nevertheless, reasonable assurance of removal (which gives consideration to the concern of the USSR re espionage) can be achieved without inspection before crating.

c. Sufficient

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c. Sufficient uncrating should be accomplished to permit inspection to the end that reasonable verification of the contents may be ascertained. This should include physical access and ~~xxx~~ photography.

5. Required Verification at Sea

a. Loading of Soviet ships will be carried out in such fashion that visual inspection of each crate is feasible. As an alternative, there could be partial unloading at another designated port to allow visual ~~xxx~~ inspection. In either event a loading plan for each outgoing vessel will be provided to facilitate inspection. This is to be a detailed plan giving location and identify of offensive weapons components.

b. Soviet ships will be instructed to rendezvous with U.S. inspection vessels and to have completed appropriate uncrating in advance of rendezvous. In the event weather makes such uncrating infeasible, a delay in time or change of rendezvous will be signalled by the inspecting ship.

c. Inspection on Board

1. This form of inspection is much to be preferred over inspection from along side and should be requested.

2. If the USSR has located any of its offensive equipment below deck, on board access to these ships will be mandatory in order to obtain adequate verification.

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(1) It will not be possible to eliminate all possibility of spoofing without physical inspection on board. However, reasonable assurance can be obtained by alongside inspection, when coupled with other indications; to permit the USG to accept the mode as a fall back position.

(2) If the US is limited to inspection from along side a vessel, all items of offensive equipment must be located on or above main deck.

(3) Inspection will require sufficient uncrating to permit photographs and visual viewing, in order to identify from among the components listed on the attached inventory, the specific component involved. (There must also be sufficient uncrating of IL 28's to reveal what components, by type and number, are contained therein).

(4) Hovering helicopters above the inspected vessel must be authorized in order to permit more comprehensive visual and photographic coverage.

6. Expertise. Each inspecting US Navy ship and boarding party will contain experts able to identify components of offensive equipment.

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A LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT SPECIAL MISSILE EQUIPMENT

TO BE USED IN MAKING UP A CHECK-OFF LIST

1. Missiles and missile transporter
2. Tracked prime mover for transporter
3. Erector vehicles
4. Fuel tank trailers
5. Wheeled prime movers for fuel vehicles
6. Oxydizer tank trailers
7. Tracked prime movers for oxydizer trailers
8. Launch stands
9. Power generators
10. Electronics vans
11. Theodolites on Pedistals

RISK

END

Note: Passed to Principle Officers Executive Committee

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